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resumen: el artículo presenta una inédita entrevista al 
profesor robert P. George (Universidad de Princeton, es-
tados Unidos) realizada con el fin de acercar a académicos 
procedentes de países no anglosajones, una visión pa-
norámica de los principales temas que actualmente son 
objeto del debate jurídico y político desde una perspectiva 
no continental. como se desarrolla en el texto, el ámbito 
anglosajón ha recuperado la desacreditada noción de de-
recho natural, a través de la nueva escuela de derecho 
natural. A través de esta nueva visión del derecho natural, 
robert P. George presenta una clara defensa de derechos 
e instituciones que actualmente se encuentran atacados 
por la tiranía de «lo políticamente correcto». George por 
medio la poderosa fuerza de la verdad y por medio de una 
clara y exquisita argumentación, invita a su interlocutor 
–sea en las aulas o a través de sus obras– a pensar por 
sí mismo sin miedo a poner en tela de juicio incluso las 
ideas y convicciones más profundas. esto porque si como 
consecuencia del diálogo recibo luces nuevas, puedo rec-
tificar y acercarme así a una verdad más plena. si, por el 
contrario, recibo explicaciones poco fundamentadas o 
si el razonamiento adolece de fallos lógicos, me servirá 
para fortalecer las propias ideas, que deben presentarse 
siempre con la apertura de quien no se considera infali-
ble. Asimismo se analiza detenidamente la naturaleza del 
derecho natural, tal como lo entiende la nueva escuela de 
derecho natural, en cuya escuela se inscribe como uno 
de sus principales figuras. Presenta también las críticas 
de las que, con cierta frecuencia, esta nueva escuela es 
objeto. resulta por ello un texto iluminador para juristas 
y filósofos interesados en conocer de primera mano los 
principios de la nueva escuela de derecho natural, aún 
poco difundida en la tradición continental. Aspecto de 
gran interés es su exposición de la metodología que, a 
su entender, debe guiar la interpretación constitucional. 
Para juristas no plenamente interiorizados en la tradición 
Abstract: this article presents an unpublished interview 
with Professor robert P. George (Princeton Universi-
ty, UsA) with the aim of reaching out to scholars from 
non-Anglo-saxon countries in order to offer a compre-
hensive view of the main issues currently being debated by 
legal and political scholars from a non-continental view-
point. the text shows how a significant number of An-
glo-saxon scholars have recovered the discredited notion 
of natural law, through the so-called «new school of nat-
ural law». with this new approach to natural law, George 
presents a clear defense of rights and institutions currently 
confronted by the tyranny of «the politically correct». one 
powerful aspect of this new school includes the elabo-
ration of arguments and counter-arguments to one’s 
own position. in this way, George invites his participant –
whether in the classroom or through his dialectical works– 
to think for him or herself without fear of questioning even 
one’s deepest ideas and convictions. As a consequence of 
this thought process, one is able to receive new lights and, 
thus, rectify and reach a more complete truth. if, on the 
contrary, one has unsupported explanations or reasonings 
with logical fallacies, the method will strengthen one’s 
personal ideas, which must always be presented with the 
openness of those who do not consider themselves infal-
lible. the main topic of this article is a detailed analysis 
of the natural law, as understood by the «new school of 
natural law», in which George is inscribed as one of its 
main protagonists. it also presents the criticisms of which 
this new school is frequently the object. it should be 
therefore an enlightening text for jurists and philosophers 
interested in knowing first¬hand the principles of this 
school, still not widespread in the continental tradition. 
Another aspect of interest is the exposition of the meth-
odology that, according to George, should guide constitu-
tional interpretation. for jurists not fully internalized in the 
tradition of Anglo-saxon common law, his explanation of 
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del Common Law anglosajón, resulta muy esclarecedora 
su explicación acerca del modo en que deben proceder los 
jueces en la resolución de los casos. estos deben limitarse, 
indica robert P. George, al papel que la constitución les ha 
atribuido: aplicar la ley, tal como ésta es. de este modo, 
ante la frecuente tendencia a convertirse indirectamente 
en legisladores, alerta que ese modo de proceder supone 
violar la constitución que han jurado defender. Un tema 
que se trata en extenso, es el del papel de la religión en 
la vida pública. si bien nuestro autor prefiere utilizar ar-
gumentos de razón en su defensa de valores, se trate de 
la protección de la vida humana en todas sus instancias, 
del matrimonio como la unión de un varón y una mujer 
abierto a la vida, de la defensa de la libertad, etc. deja 
claro que la religión constituye una instancia con pleno 
derecho a participar aportando conocimientos y valores 
en favor del bien común socio-político, tal como lo han 
hecho muchas de las figuras más relevantes de la histo-
ria de los estados Unidos. de este modo, no aboga por la 
neutralidad en el esfera pública, pero tampoco apoya un 
gobierno sacro. Aboga, por una sociedad no sólo «civil» 
sino «civilizada», es decir aquella en la que cada ciuda-
dano puede manifestar con sus palabras y su conducta 
el propio modo de ver las cosas, en un ámbito de respeto 
mutuo que no se identifica con un relativismo. sí se espera 
que cada ciudadano al presentar su ideas o conductas, sea 
capaz de dar razón de ellas, ya sea desde una perspectiva 
secular o religiosa.
Palabras clave: nueva escuela de derecho natural; John 
finnis; libertad religiosa; libertad de conciencia; libertad de 
expresión; universidad; bienes básicos; derechos natura-
les; interpretación judicial; sociedad civil.
how judges should proceed when resolving different cases 
is insightful. the judges must be limited, says George, to 
the role that the constitution has assigned to them: to 
apply the law as is. thus, Given the frequent tendency for 
judges to indirectly become legislators, he warns that this 
mode of proceeding presupposes frequent violations of 
the constitution that they have sworn to defend. Another 
topic extensively argued is the role of religion in public life. 
Although George prefers to make use of rational argu-
ments in his defense of values (among them the protec-
tion of human life in all its instances, marriage as the un-
ion of a man and a woman open to life, or the defense of 
freedom, etc.), he makes it clear that religion has the right 
to participate in public life by contributing its knowledge 
and values in favor of the socio-political common good as 
many important figures have done in the history of United 
states. Hence, George does not advocate neutrality in the 
public sphere, nor does he support the opposite extreme: 
a «sacred public square». He supports a society that is not 
only «civil» but also «civilized», that is to say, a society in 
which every citizen can manifest his words and/or his ide-
as and beliefs in an ambiance of mutual respect. such a 
society believes that every citizen not only has the right to 
think, to believe and to live according to his views, but also 
is able to give reasons for them, whether from a secular or 
religious perspective.
Keywords: new school of natural law; John finnis; 
religious freedom; freedom of conscience; freedom of 
speach; university; basic goods; natural rights; constitu-
tional interpretation; civil society.
introducción
A unque el profesor de la Universidad de Princeton Robert P. George no necesita presentación en ambientes anglosajones, dada su decidida pre-sencia en revistas académicas, artículos para la prensa, conferencias y 
clases en las más variadas sedes, este artículo tiene como fin hacerlo presente –a 
través de sus propias palabras– en el ambiente académico español y latinoame-
ricano.
Robert P. George es McCormick Profesor de Jurisprudencia de la Uni-
versidad de Princeton, y director y fundador del James Madison Program. 
Este programa reúne en la Universidad de Princeton, año tras año, a grupos 
de intelectuales que dedican un año exclusivamente a la investigación, en te-
mas de derecho constitucional, teoría política y otros relacionados con ellos. 
De este modo, desde el año 2000 al presente ya ha reunido más de ciento cin-
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cuenta profesores que forman parte de la «James Madison Society»; sociedad 
académica que, en palabras de su fundador, «una vez que se forma parte de 
ella, se permanece en ella, como sucede en una familia».
La conversación que sigue a esta introducción muestra la relevancia del 
Prof. George así como los principales temas de su interés: el derecho natural, 
tal como lo entiende la Nueva Escuela del Derecho Natural, la libertad reli-
giosa, la importancia de las humanidades, la libertad de pensamiento y expre-
sión, el papel de la religión en la esfera pública, etc. Sin embargo, conviene 
agregar que no se trata de un mero discurso teórico acerca del valor de esas 
cuestiones, sino de la convicción demostrada por Robert P. George en su prác-
tica didáctica, académica, investigadora y de asesoramiento formal e informal 
de todos los que a él se acercan en búsqueda de guía, consejo o ayuda.
Su convicción de que la búsqueda del conocimiento y el mantenimiento 
de una sociedad libre y democrática exige el cultivo y la práctica de las virtu-
des, fundamenta el modo en que se dirige a cada persona y la manera como 
trata los diferentes temas. Entre otras virtudes, vale señalar la humildad inte-
lectual, la apertura de mente, y sobre todo el amor a la verdad. De este modo, 
Robert P. George se ha convertido en uno de los académicos estadounidenses 
que conjuga de modo admirable sus convicciones sólidas con el diálogo y la 
amistad con personas que piensan de modo diverso.
Robert P. George se caracteriza por saber escuchar al interlocutor con 
atención y respeto, con la permanente ilusión de aprender de los demás, se 
trate de un colega, de un doctorando o un alumno de licenciatura. A partir de 
esa escucha atenta, al modo socrático, por medio de interrogantes la verdad se 
desvela al interlocutor poco a poco, de modo misterioso como todo lo que –de 
algún modo– es propio del hombre y, a la vez, en cierto modo lo supera. Esto 
no significa que todas las opiniones sean igualmente válidas, o que todos los 
que se expresan en la vida académica o pública aporten argumentos del mismo 
valor. Tampoco implica, ciertamente, que no exista la verdad ni que el inte-
lecto humano que la busca con rectitud no pueda alcanzarla. En este sentido, 
Robert P. George se distancia tanto de quienes desconfían de las posibilidades 
del conocimiento y del deber de buscar la verdad, como de aquellos académi-
cos que idolatran su propia opinión y no escuchan a quienes afirman posturas 
diversas a las suyas.
Propone a sus alumnos y a todos los que acuden a él, ser personas que 
escuchan con atención y respeto a todas las personas. De este modo, si se está 
en el error se puede rectificar; y siempre sirve para profundizar en el entendi-
miento y fortalecimiento de las propias habilidades de defender racionalmente 
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las verdades que se sostiene. Asimismo, afirma Robert P. George que el deseo 
sincero de escuchar y respetar a aquellos que ponen en duda incluso nuestras 
certezas más profundas, contribuye a mantener un ambiente universitario que 
se caracteriza por la libertad de expresar las propias ideas, incluso cuando se 
trata de aquellas que no gozan de popularidad. De este modo, se crea un ethos, 
que protege a todo intelectual de cualquier tendencia dogmática o «pensa-
miento de grupo» que resultan tóxicas para la salud de toda comunidad inte-
lectual.
En definitiva, Robert P. George es un verdadero universitario en el senti-
do más puro e ilustre de la expresión, de lo cual es muestra, que ya ha formado 
a un grupo no pequeño de académicos que siguen sus huellas en búsqueda de 
la verdad a través de la vida intelectual.
introduction
Although Princeton University Professor Robert P. George need not be 
introduced to Anglo-Saxon scholars given his strong presence in academic 
journals, press op-ed, lectures and courses delivered in various venues, this 
article aims at introducing him more broadly, and through his own words, to 
the Spanish and Latin American academic environment.
Robert P. George serves as the McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence at 
Princeton University, where he is also the Director and Founder of the James 
Madison Program. Every year, the James Madison Program gathers a group 
of intellectuals who devote one year exclusively to research in matters of con-
stitutional law, political theory, history, etc. Since 2000, the James Madison 
Program has gathered more than one hundred and fifty scholars who are now 
part of the «James Madison Society», an academic society in which, in the 
words of its founder, «It’s like a family; once you join, you’ll always be part of 
it.»
The conversation that follows this introduction demonstrates the rele-
vance of Prof. George, as well as his main topic of interest: natural law – as 
forged by the New School of Natural Law – religious freedom, the impor-
tance of the humanities to understand ourselves and Western culture, free-
dom of thought and expression, the role of religion in the public arena, etc. Is 
important to stress that Robert George does not develop a mere theoretical 
discourse, but rather shows his personal convictions in a deeply and rationally 
argumentative way.
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Prof. Georges is persuaded that the search for knowledge and the 
main-tenance of a free and democratic society requires the cultivation and 
practice of the virtues. Among other virtues, it is worth emphasizing intel-
lectual humility, openness of mind, and above all, love of truth. Following 
this path, Robert P. George has become one of the American academics who 
best combines his strong convictions with dialogue and friendship with people 
who think differently.
Robert P. George is characterized by his willingness to listen to his in-
ter-locutor with attention and respect, with the permanent hope of learning 
from others, be it from a colleague, a doctoral student or an undergraduate 
student. By his attentive listening and Socratic interrogation, the truth is re-
vealed to the interlocutor. This does not mean that all opinions are equally 
valid, or that all those who express themselves in the academic or public life 
contribute with arguments of the same value. Neither does it imply that truth 
does not exist nor that the human intellect that seeks it with rectitude cannot 
attain it. In this sense, Robert P. George distances himself from those who 
distrust the possibilities of knowledge and the duty to seek the truth, as well as 
of those scholars who idolize their own opinion and do not listen to those who 
affirm different positions to theirs.
He proposes to his students and to all those who come to him, to be peo-
ple who listen with attention and respect to the people who challenge their 
own beliefs and values. In this way, if one is in error, he can rectify it; and it 
always serves to deepen one’s own understanding and strengthen one’s ability 
to rationally defend his beliefs and attitudes toward truth. Robert P. George 
argues that the sincere desire to listen and respect those who question even 
our deepest values contributes to maintaining a university environment; that 
is, an institution characterized by the freedom to express one’s own ideas, even 
those that are unpopular. In this way, an ethos is created which protects every 
intellectual from any dogmatic «group-think» which is toxic to the health of 
any intellectual community.
In short, Robert P. George is an academic in the purest and most eminent 
sense of the expression, a fact that is revealed by the group of young academ-
ics who follow in his footsteps in search and service of truth throughout the 
intellectual life.
* * *
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Maria Alejandra Vanney: In order to understand your work, it might be 
especially helpful to know which are the key aspects of your intellectual biog-
raphy? How and when did your interest in Philosophy of Law and in the New 
Natural Law Theory begin? What led you to think that Natural Law Theory 
was more than darkness and fallacies (an opinion that probably many scholars 
hold in your academic field)?
Robert P. George: I became interested in philosophy of law and related 
fields such as moral and political philosophy when I was an undergraduate stu-
dent. I had two seminars with a professor of medieval thought at Swarthmore 
College. His name was Linwood Urban. He was not a widely published schol-
ar, but he was a very good teacher and I studied the writings of St. Thomas 
Aquinas, among other thinkers, with him. I became very interested in the 
sections of the Summa Theologiae on law and legal obligation, and in particular 
in the question of the proper role of the State in enforcing moral obligations.
This of course led to an interest in the question of the rational foun-
dations of moral norms. Then studying with Professor Urban and others, I 
encountered the works of David Hume and the skeptical position about the 
capacity of the mind to grasp more-than-merely-instrumental reasons for ac-
tion, including moral principles.
I became deeply interested in the debate between neo-scholasticism and 
Humeanism, and I remember thinking that the neo-scholastics writers whom 
I was reading seemed to have a very good critique of Hume, and yet my read-
ing of Hume led me to believe that a Humean could offer a very powerful 
critique of the positive program of the neo-scholastic writers. So I found nei-
ther side making a persuasive positive case, but both sides making a persuasive 
negative case, a persuasive criticism of the other side.
It was in relation to trying to think my way through that dilemma or set 
of dilemmas that I encountered the work of Germain Grisez. It seemed to 
me that Grisez had developed a sound account of how the mind grasps basic 
practical principles and the proper way to identify and defend objective values 
and moral norms.
We should understand basic values (what Grisez calls «basic human 
goods») as ends or purposes that provide more-than-merely-instrumental 
reasons for action, and we should understand moral principles and norms as 
specifications of the integral directiveness of the various aspects of human well 
being and fulfillment.
This led me eventually to John Finnis’ book Natural Law and Natural 
Rights, which was published in 1980 as I was entering law school at Harvard, 
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and I relied on that work in connection with some courses in which I was 
studying philosophy of law. I soon began thinking about what contribution I 
myself could make using the insights of Grisez and Finnis but focusing on the 
question that had become interesting to me in college of the legal enforce-
ment of moral obligations. Before long I was developing some ideas about the 
proper scope and limits of the power of law and the State to enforce moral 
obligations for the sake of the common good – ideas that would launch me 
into my career as a professional philosopher in the field of philosophy of law 
and in moral and political philosophy.
Fortunately for me, I had the opportunity to study with Professor Finnis, 
as well as with Joseph Raz as a doctoral student at Oxford after I finished my 
law studies at Harvard. There I wrote a thesis on the legal enforcement of 
moral obligations in natural law theories.
MAV: And whom do you consider to be the main authors that have in-
fluenced you during your education?
RPG: The most important influence on my approach to intellectual life 
was Plato, whose dialogue Gorgias I encountered in my second year as an un-
dergraduate, in a general introduction to political philosophy. The Gorgias 
struck me like a lightening bolt because it led me to see that I was approaching 
intellectual life in an entirely incorrect manner, seeking knowledge not for its 
own sake but only for its instrumental value. Plato’s arguments were a power-
ful corrective to that way of understanding the life of the mind, the intellectual 
life. The seeds of my becoming a professor were in that encounter with Plato.
In addition to Professor Urban, I had a wonderful professor named 
James Kurth, who was not a philosopher, but rather taught me international 
relations and American foreign policy. Professor Kurth was and is a deep and 
analytically powerful thinker. He taught me both by precept and example to 
be as analytically rigorous as possible in thinking through intellectual prob-
lems. And then of course, after law school the two biggest influences on me 
were my teachers at Oxford whom I mentioned, Prof. Finnis and Prof. Raz.
MAV: Although they have very different visions...
RPG: yes, in some ways it is true, in another ways they are quite sim-
ilar. They are both working within the analytic tradition of philosophy, and 
they are both critical of ethical subjectivism or relativism. They have differ-
ent accounts of moral norms and different judgments on questions of norma-
tive ethics, but both reject the non-cognitivism and subjectivism that were so 
prevalent among analytic philosophers of a different generation, though there 
were exceptions, which were powerful influences on me as well – for example 
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Elizabeth Anscombe. I knew her only a little and I didn’t formally study with 
her, but she was an important influence on my thinking.
MAV: The new school of natural law was developed in English-speaking 
countries and so maybe it is interesting for other audiences to know what it has 
in common with the classic natural law theories and what is new or different.
RPG: The architects of the New Natural Law Theory, whose alleged 
newness is a matter of dispute that I will come back to in a moment, are Anglo-
phone philosophers beginning with Grisez and Finnis and the late (and sorely 
missed) Professor Joseph Boyle of the University of Toronto, and including 
the next generation of New Natural Law thinkers, such as Patrick Lee, Chris-
topher Tollefsen and myself. Now there is a third generation of people like my 
students Sherif Girgis, Melissa Moschella, and Daniel Mark. So it’s really been 
dominated and developed by Anglophone thinkers. The other thing is that it’s 
clearly a movement within the broader tradition of analytic philosophy. So, if 
we use just for rough purposes (and one cannot be precise about this bound-
ary) the distinction between continental philosophy and analytic philosophy, 
it is clear that new natural law theory is a movement within the analytic tradi-
tion of philosophy, which will cause it to seem a little alien for people outside 
that tradition – people trained in continental approaches to philosophy, for 
example. So, I hope, certainly, that more people from different cultures and 
nations, representing a broader spectrum of backgrounds and languages will 
become interested in the so-called «new natural law» approach. I’m glad that 
my own works and Professor Finnis’ works are now being widely translated.
Now on the question of its relationship with classical natural law think-
ing, I myself believe that it is in line with the tradition that begins with Plato 
and especially Aristotle, and then is developed and enriched in highly original 
ways by Saint Thomas Aquinas. I think it’s in line with that although I also 
believe it adds to that tradition, it makes a contribution to that tradition. I 
do not think that there is any significant break between Aquinas and the new 
natural law theorists. Of course, that is a point on which the critics of the 
new natural law disagree, e.g. Professor Ralph McInerny and Professor Henry 
Veatch. There is a question of whether new natural law theorists attempt to 
eliminate the metaphysical assumptions of classical Thomism. I would argue 
that we do not. In fact, we defend them, and perhaps we defend them even 
more vigorously than our critics within the natural law camp do themselves. 
So, Professor Grisez and Professor Boyle have written a very important book 
defending freedom of the will, metaphysical freedom. Professor Lee and I 
have collaborated on a book defending the unity of the person against Car-
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tesian and other forms of body-self dualism. Several people in our tradition 
have written important works on the relationship between ethics and theolo-
gy, between God and moral obligation. An early important contribution was 
the final chapter of John Finnis’ «Natural Law and Natural Rights», which 
was about God and the relationship of theism to the natural law ethical theory 
that he propounded in the book. Grisez’ book «Beyond the New Theism» is 
a valuable contribution to the defense of some metaphysical theses that are 
integral to the new natural law theory.
The complaint of our critics, I think, derives entirely from their objec-
tion to our view, which we defend carefully and extensively, that (as a logical 
matter) one cannot draw a normative conclusion from a purely descriptive set 
of premises. To draw a normative conclusion, you need at least one normative 
premise and in ethics, the normative premises will include a grasp of some 
end or purpose, or ends and purposes, that provide more-than-instrumental 
reasons for action (inasmuch as they represent something intrinsically and 
constitutively valuable for human beings – e.g., having and being a friend, 
improving one’s mind through intellectual engagement and the acquisition of 
knowledge, acting for the sake of preserving one’s authenticity and integrity). 
There are various ends or purposes that are more than merely instrumentally 
valuable, that are constitutive aspects of our wellbeing and fulfillment as hu-
man beings, not merely means to anything else. They may, in addition to hav-
ing intrinsic value, have instrumental value; but their value is not reducible to 
their instrumental value. Some such value must be in the premises of any valid 
inference to a normative conclusion about, say, whether it’s morally acceptable 
to tell a lie or lead a nation into a certain war, or any of the other disputed 
questions. We agree completely with St Thomas Aquinas, who argues in the 
famous question of the Summae Theologiae about whether than is only one first 
principle of practical reason or many first principles, that there are many first 
principles of practical reason, not just one, and that these principles are per se 
nota, and indemonstrabilia. Aquinas could not be clearer about this. We affirm 
it, and I do have a bit of trouble understanding why our critics, who claim to 
be more faithful Thomists than we are, do not themselves affirm it or see its 
centrality to the thought of Aquinas on ethics.
MAV: Going back to the influences you received. What role have other 
sources (family, historical events, circumstances, religious institutions, cultur-
al situations) played in the development of your thought and do you think that 
it important to consider these influences with regard to a professor’s intellec-
tual development for the students, and to what extent?
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RPG: In my own personal history, a very important element was the 
emergence of abortion as a significant issue of American culture and public 
life. This was in the 1970s. I was still very young, perhaps 13 or 14 years old, 
and my mother became involved in the pro-life movement in our community, 
which was Morgantown, West Virginia. There was a Catholic chaplaincy at 
West Virginia University, and at the chaplaincy, in those days, the local pro-
life group would meet. It consisted of some students, particularly some grad-
uate students. I remember two graduate students in philosophy who would 
regularly attend the meetings together with people from the community like 
my mother, who was not herself university educated, but was very interested 
in the issue and determined to defend the lives of the unborn. She herself had 
had five children. I had very clear memories, even at that age, of the births of 
my youngest brothers. Even at that age, I was aware that when my mother 
was pregnant and when she would let me feel the baby kick, that it was a baby 
kicking, not a potato or a «mass of cells» or something else. So, I didn’t have 
any doubt about what was in there. My mother recruited me into the pro-life 
movement and I began to attend those meetings and that was perhaps my first 
experience with hearing ethical argumentation, hearing the graduate students 
in philosophy make the ethical case for the pro-life position. I had great ad-
miration for them. I knew what I thought, because I had felt the babies kick. I 
had had that experience, but they could give a powerful intellectual case, and 
that was very inspiring to me. Defending human life in all stages and condi-
tions has remained central to my thinking, and a central concern of mine in 
my professional life as a scholar and teacher. I have published many articles 
on the subject, and I regularly teach courses in which the subject is addressed. 
I served on the President’s Council on Bioethics under the chairmanship of 
the great thinker Dr. Leon Kass – another scholar who profoundly influenced 
me. I’ve been an activist in the pro-life movement. I have given public service 
devoted to advancing the pro-life cause. So that’s a case in which an issue of 
public concern has helped to shape my life as a scholar.
MAV: Regarding your teaching experience, among other courses, you 
teach Constitutional Interpretation, here at Princeton University. Could you 
give a brief interpretation of the methodology you use in the interpretation of 
law? I suppose that it is quite different from continental tradition.
RPG: yes. I believe that in the interpretation of statutes, interpreters (in-
cluding judges) should make every effort to be faithful to the intention of the 
legislators. It is after all the work of the legislature that makes a proposition 
or a principle a law, and not just somebody’s idea. Courts should not usurp the 
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authority of the legislature by manipulating legislative enactments to bring 
them into line with the judges’ political preferences. That is judicial lawless-
ness. That is infidelity to law by people who have sworn an oath to be faithful 
to the law. On questions of constitutional interpretation, where constitutions 
are like the constitutions of the United States, they are not extensive codes, 
they have a different character. I believe that the constitutional interpreter, 
including the judge, should look where possible to the plain meaning of the 
text, again trying to give effect to the understanding and purposes of the rati-
fiers of the constitutional text in question. Where the text is not entirely clear 
or determinative of the meaning – where we don’t seem to be able to simply 
apply the text to the question in a straightforward way – then I think inter-
preters, including judges, should look to the logic of the text. What are its 
presuppositions? What are its logical implications? In a sense, the law includes 
more than simply the words interpreted strictly literally. It includes what is 
presupposed by the principle that has been enacted and what is logically en-
tailed by it. But here, in my judgment, judges have a moral obligation to be, 
and the law requires them to be, very strict with themselves, holding to the 
actual logic of the provision and not simply using their raw power to substitute 
their own judgments for the judgments of those who ratified the constitution, 
making it law. In addition to the text and the logic of its provisions, some-
times the meaning of a constitutional text will become clear by looking to 
the structure of the constitution or the part of the constitution in which the 
provision appears, the structure of the document or sometimes the structure 
of the set of institutions established by the document. I think that in the case 
of the 14th amendment to the Constitution of the United States, light is shed 
when we look at the relationship between the principle of the protection of 
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States and the principle of 
due process of law, which must be accorded to all persons, and the principle 
of the equal protection of the law, which also must be accorded to all persons 
within their jurisdiction by the states. Sometimes problems that seem puzzling 
will become clear. The puzzle will be dissolved if we look at the structure of 
the constitution or of the article of the constitution in which the relevant 
provisions are contained or the structure of the institutions created by the 
constitution. And then, I think the fourth source of meaning and illumination 
for interpreters, including judges, is the historical understanding of the text. 
How was the text originally understood? What was its meaning as understood 
by the people who proposed and then the people who ratified the text? Was 
there a publicly understood meaning? If so, that should give us a great deal 
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of guidance as to how it should be applied, even when it’s being applied to a 
new problem. So, for example, the ratifiers of the fourth amendment of the 
United States constitution had no idea that there would ever be such a thing 
as electronic surveillance; and yet, their principles restricting the powers of 
police to engage in searches during criminal investigations, or to seize papers 
or other documents, are applicable today, even in cases in which issues arise 
that involve electronic surveillance. The principle is perfectly capable of being 
applied in the way that the ratifiers thought it should be applied despite the 
fact that the technology has now expanded the ways in which police can search 
for evidence. I think that is just one example of a very common phenomenon. 
So, to sum it up, I believe that the sources of illumination for constitutional 
interpreters, what might be described as the sources of constitutional mean-
ing, are: the text, its logic, its structure, and its historical understanding.
MAV: Perhaps continental legal interpretation is not so different from 
that in the United States.
RPG: We, in the United States, are inheritors of the common law of 
England. We have changed a lot of it. We have now codified a great deal of 
our law (private law, criminal law, and so forth), however we still have the 
principle of precedent, which we call stare decisis. Now, that is not an absolute. 
Courts often overturn themselves and overrule a previous decision. But it is, 
as I understand it, a difference from the continental civil code.
MAV: I see that in the codified system, the judges cannot do much be-
cause the rules are very strict. While in common law, there is much more 
room for flexibility on the part of the judges. So, in the US it can be risky. But 
the problem is that in continental law, the role of the legislative branch is very 
political. Perhaps here in the common law system, the political aspect and 
political risk falls on the judges.
RPG: yes, I think that’s right. I don’t know if that is somehow written 
into the script when one choses between the two systems. But historically as 
things have played out, certainly in our system judges have frequently abused 
their power and have usurped the authority of the legislative branch under 
the pretext of giving effect to constitutional guarantees. This happened with 
regard to the issue of slavery in the 1850s in Dred Scott vs. Sanford, in which 
the court, claiming a constitutional warrant, but having none, invalidated the 
efforts of Congress to restrict the spread of slavery to the federal territories of 
the United States. The same thing happened in 1973 in the abortion case of 
Roe vs. Wade. There, again without any constitutional warrant, again claim-
ing they had one but having none, and having the flimsiest argument which 
El prEsEntE y El futuro dEl dErEcho natural: una convErsación con r. p. GEorGE
PERSONA y DERECHO / VOL. 76 / 2017/1 297
one can barely call an argument as it was nothing more than a set of asser-
tions, the court invalidated all state laws protecting unborn children from be-
ing slain in abortions.
Despite the fact that nothing in the text, logic, structure, or historical 
understanding of the Constitution so much as hints at a right to take the life 
of a child in the womb, the court invalidated the laws of the various states 
forbidding or seriously restricting abortion. It was a flagrant usurpation of the 
authority accorded by the Constitution to the legislative branch rather than 
to the judicial branch. And now the Supreme Court has done it again on the 
issue of marriage, manufacturing a «right» to «same-sex marriage» without 
the slightest constitutional warrant. Another gross usurpation. Another case 
of flagrant judicial lawlessness. So the history of our jurisprudence is mixed. 
While we’ve had moments of triumph – courts have sometimes done the con-
stitutionally right thing and done the right thing very bravely – the record of 
the courts has been marred by case after case of usurpation. When the court 
oversteps its own authority you have the tragedy of an institution whose role 
is supposed to be to protect the rule of law, now undermining the rule of law 
by engaging in unconstitutional – indeed anti-constitutional – acts by which 
they essentially steal power given under the Constitution to a different branch 
of government. It is political theft.
MAV: What do you think the role is for religious arguments in the cur-
rent moral debates in democratic and constitutional society, if any?
RPG: I believe that there is a robust role for religion in public life. Cer-
tainly in the life of a pluralistic democracy, it would be a scandal to require 
people to divest themselves of their religious beliefs and motives or their re-
ligious language when entering the public square to fulfill their obligations 
as citizens to advance justice and the common good. In fact, if we look at the 
history of reform movements in the United States – the movement to abolish 
slavery, for example, or the movement to protect children and women work-
ers against exploitation, or the movement to repeal racial segregation in our 
public institutions, right down to today’s movement to defend the life of the 
child in the womb – they have been led by religious people who have made 
the case to their fellow citizens in religious as well as secular terms. The aboli-
tionists who sought to abolish slavery spoke of God’s condemnation of slavery. 
Lincoln speaks of God’s condemnation of slavery in his 2nd inaugural address. 
He says that the carnage of the Civil War was brought on the nation because 
of the sin of slavery. If we look at the effort to protect women and children 
workers, the leaders of that were ministers or religiously devout women. If we 
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look at the movement to repeal segregation, it was led by the Reverend Dr. 
Martin Luther King, a Baptist Minister, and his chief lieutenant, the Reverend 
Ralph Abernathy, also a minister, speaking in Biblical language, arguing that 
segregation, racial injustice, was a sin against God, who had created human 
beings, with a profound, inherent and equal dignity. King appealed to the 
Biblical principle of the brotherhood of man under the common fatherhood 
of God. What a scandal it would be to ask people now, in view of this great 
history, to divest themselves of their religious beliefs or language when they 
enter the public square.
Now, bad things have been done in the name of religion as well. But bad 
things have been done in the name of secular ideologies, just as sometimes 
good things have been done. I think that the public square that we need is a 
public square that welcomes all voices, those who are coming from religious 
perspectives of various kind, Protestant and Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, 
Mormon, Jewish, Muslim, and those who are coming from secular vantage 
points. Let them enter the public square and engage in civil debates, and form 
alliances where they can do so to advance the causes that they believe in.
They should try to appeal to the consciences of their fellow citizens in 
the language that they think will make the case honestly but powerfully and 
try to persuade their fellow citizens of what they think justice and the com-
mon good require. This is what we have always done in America. That is 
what we should continue doing, and I would recommend this for any plural-
istic democracy, indeed for any just regime. We should not prejudice things 
in advance of the debate, in favor of religion, but we should not prejudice 
things against religion either. The late Fr. Richard John Neuhaus was a great 
American thinker, a Lutheran minister who became a Catholic priest. He was 
a very important American public intellectual, who died just a few years ago. 
Commenting on the effort that was then very strong to relegate religion to the 
purely private sphere in the United States, he referred to that as an effort to 
create a «naked public square» and he said that the correct view was not that. 
We don’t need a naked public square. This would be contrary to our history 
and contrary to justice. But, we don’t need a sacred public square either, where 
religion is given the upper hand and secular ideologies are put in an inferior 
position even before engaging in a fair debate. We need a civil public square, 
not a sacred public square or a naked public square. A civil public square is 
one in which people can come fully clothed in their own worldviews, be they 
religious or secular, and vie for the allegiance of their fellow citizens, making 
the arguments as best they can.
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Now, having said all that, and affirming the relevance of religious prin-
ciples in public life, I myself believe that there is an important role for argu-
ments that defend positions that can be defended on the basis of revelation 
for religious believers, or in natural law terms, where we try to explain the 
reasons people have, even apart from revelation, for say, protecting the life 
of the unborn child or protecting marriage as the conjugal union of husband 
and wife, or protecting liberty of conscience. Religious people shouldn’t reject 
that. From the point of view of a religious person, those arguments should be 
welcomed because they seek to explain why a loving God, who wills the good 
for human beings, would want the unborn child to be treated with equal dig-
nity, for example, and why marriage is the conjugal union of husband and wife. 
In a certain sense, from a religious point of view, natural law argumentation 
is attempting to explain God’s reasons and to defend principles and policies 
for the reasons that God himself, as best we can tell, supports them and wants 
them to be honored. So, my own contributions have not been to enter the 
public square as Martin Luther King did or articulate my positions in religious 
language. I have no objection to that. I think it’s good and I’m glad people are 
doing it. But my own contribution, my own vocation, is to make natural law 
arguments, to engage those on the other side on the plane of reason without 
appeal to revelation or authority of any kind, religious or otherwise, apart 
from the authority of reason itself. I think that that’s an important contribu-
tion to make and I try to make it.
MAV: In 2013, you wrote the book «Conscience and Its Enemies». In a 
country like the United States where freedom is a sacred value, do you think 
that freedom of conscience and freedom of thought are under attack? And if 
so, do you think that the problem is democracy as a regime or is it rather a 
deformation of what democracy really is?
RPG: yes, I do believe that freedom of conscience, and the specific in-
stance of that general freedom we call freedom of religion, are under attack. 
Not only here. Obviously there are some places of the world, such as some 
parts of the Middle East, parts of Asia and Africa, in which the attacks on 
rights of religious freedom and freedom of conscience are much more severe. 
These are places where people are not only being deprived of employment 
opportunities, professional advancement, educational opportunities and so 
forth, they are being deprived of their very lives. So, we cannot really compare 
the situation in the U.S. and the other western democracies with such places 
when it comes to the magnitude of the evil. Think of the atrocities being com-
mitted by ISIS or Boko Haram in the Middle East or in Africa. And yet, we 
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must nevertheless, for the sake of justice and the common good, and for the 
sake of the integrity of our democratic societies, say what is true, which is that 
religious freedom and the rights of conscience are indeed under attack here. 
There are efforts to compel physicians, nurses and other healthcare workers 
to become complicit in abortion, even against their consciences. There are 
efforts to compel people in healthcare professions to perform abortions, in 
the case of physicians, or participate in abortions, in the case of nurses and 
assistants, and to refer for abortions, and this extends not only to individuals 
but to institutions, such as a Catholic hospital or an Orthodox Jewish hospital 
or an Evangelical Christian healthcare facility. We have seen a big debate here 
over the efforts of the Obama administration, which I regard as an enemy of 
conscience, to compel employers to provide insurance coverage that includes 
abortion-inducing drugs, even if the employers are themselves pro-life people 
who as a matter of conscience simply cannot implicate themselves in abortion 
by providing coverage for those drugs. We see the same thing in the area of 
marriage, attempts to compel photographers, bakers, people who provide fa-
cilities for weddings or other ceremonies, to implicate themselves in the bless-
ing or celebration of unions that they regard, either for religious reasons or 
other reasons, as profoundly immoral. This is an attack on conscience as well.
We have seen in the cultural sphere, people who have been forced out 
of their jobs, like the great technology genius, Brendan Eich, who lost his job 
as CEO of Mozilla because he had contributed money to the movement to 
defend marriage in California. We see efforts to smear and stigmatize people 
who are pro-life or people who are pro-marriage as bigots or «homophobes» 
or misogynists or haters. Now, I do not blame democracy for this. I do not 
think this kind of injustice is inherent in democracy. Democracy is, as Win-
ston Churchill said, «the worst form of government, except for all the oth-
ers». The question is, can you have a democracy that functions well and justly 
without the broader context being one in which moral values are promoted 
and upheld and transmitted to each new generation by the institutions of civil 
society, beginning with the family. The answer to that question is no, you 
cannot. Democracy is what we should be aiming for, as far as the nature of the 
regime is concerned. We should try to create democracies where we can and 
we should try to create the conditions of democracy where the conditions do 
not obtain, so that later we can have democracy. I am in favor of the democ-
ratization movement throughout the world and yet we must remember that 
democracy can only work justly when it is one part of a larger picture. That 
larger picture must include a healthy civil society that includes a vibrant mar-
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riage culture and family structure, so that people have intact families that are 
able to perform their fundamental role in transmitting the virtues needed for 
successful lives and democratic citizenship to each new generation.
RPG: We need situations in which we have not only democracy but 
flourishing religious institutions that play the leading role in assisting parents 
(mothers and fathers) in teaching virtue to their children and we need civic 
associations of every description, religious and non-religious, to also play their 
roles in society.
MAV: Universities...
RPG: Universities, other educational institutions. yes, this is true. 
Sometimes people err by supposing that the only two relevant elements of 
discussion about politics are the individual and the state. But there is a third 
element that is absolutely crucial: civil society. It is a complex element, and 
the foundation of any civil society is the marriage-based family. But there is 
more, there are religious organizations, civic associations, educational organ-
izations, self-help organizations, fraternal organizations that help to deliver 
health, education, and welfare services to help people meet their needs. The 
government should do some of that but it shouldn’t do all of that. That is why 
we need civil society. So yes, I am for democracy, but we need to recognize 
the democracy by itself cannot produce, much less guarantee, justice. It will 
become a mechanism of injustice if we do not have the supporting institutions 
that enable democracy to flourish.
MAV: you have been chairman of the US Commission on International 
Religious Freedom, can you explain the main mission of this body and what 
you have learned from being a part of it. What do you think the role of inter-
faith dialogue is today?
RPG: I have had the honor in my life of serving on three US govern-
ment commissions, and one United Nations commission. My first service was 
on the United States Commission for Civil Rights, to which I was appointed 
by President George H. W. Bush and then, as I mentioned, I served on the 
President’s Council on Bioethics under President George W. Bush. Then I 
served as the American member of UNESCO’s World Commission on the 
Ethics of Scientific Knowledge and Technology. Most recently I served on 
and chaired the US Commission on International Religious Freedom. The 
Commission on Religious Freedom was founded in 1998. It was created by 
the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, passed by Congress and 
signed into law by President Clinton. It created three institutions: an office 
of religious freedom in the State Department, which is our foreign ministry, 
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an ambassador-at-large for religious freedom, and an independent agency, not 
answerable to Congress, an independent agency like the US Commission on 
Civil Rights, with Republicans and Democrats alike serving as commissioners. 
The appointments are structured to ensure that there is an almost even divi-
sion between members who have been appointed by Republicans and those 
appointed by Democrats. The President has some of the appointments, the 
Speaker of the House has some of the appointments, the Majority Leader of 
the Senate has an appointment, and the minority leaders of House and Senate 
have an appointment. There are nine members. They elect their own Chair-
man and two Vice-Chairmen. The mission is to monitor religious freedom 
throughout the globe and to report to Congress and the President on reli-
gious freedom conditions in the various nations, and to advocate on behalf of 
religious freedom as part of the foreign and diplomatic policy of the United 
States.
The thought is that there will always be a strong lobby in favor of trade 
and economics. There will always be the United States Chamber of Com-
merce and other business associations that will attempt to influence the gov-
ernment in ways that will make conditions favorable for trade with foreign 
nations. I have no objection to this, by the way. There will always be a pow-
erful lobby on behalf of military and geostrategic concerns in the formation 
of the United States diplomatic policy. What the Religious Freedom Act of 
1998 attempts to ensure is that there will also be a powerful lobby on behalf 
of religious freedom. The Act seeks to prevent religious freedom from being 
relegated to a third-class status when it comes to forming the diplomatic pol-
icy of the United States.
The commission has been given some tools, the most important of which 
is the power to recommend that certain nations be designated countries of par-
ticular concern (CPCs). These are the worst offenders against religious free-
dom. These are countries or regimes that are guilty of «ongoing, systematic, 
and egregious violations of religious freedom,» to quote the words of the Inter-
national Religious Freedom Act. Either the governments are persecuting people 
or denying them religious freedom, or the governments are standing by while 
private actors – terrorists, mobs, thugs – persecute people, usually minorities, 
based on their faith, either because the government won’t do anything about it, 
doesn’t want to do anything about it, or can’t do anything about it because the 
government is too weak to stop the offending parties from offending.
When we recommend a country to be listed as a CPC, the State Depart-
ment must consider whether to make that designation official, to accept that 
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designation. If it does, then ordinarily consequences for that nation follow in 
the diplomatic and trade areas. There are certain steps that presidents and 
other executive branch officers take against those nations in an effort to in-
centivize them to improve their human rights record in the religious freedom 
area. The President and the Secretary of State are not required to accept the 
recommendations, but where they do accept them, certain things follow. The 
President can accept the designation and waive any sanctions. But, where a 
President does that, as the past three Presidents have done in the case of Saudi 
Arabia, they will have to bear the political cost of doing that. So, I think that 
Congress came up with a pretty good system. Presidents will think long and 
hard before granting a waiver. And, on the Commission, we have made the 
case to Presidents that where they grant waivers, those waivers should not 
be permanent. If a waiver is granted, it should be temporary and conditional. 
In my opinion, it should only be continued if there is improvement. Other-
wise, the waiver should be removed and the sanctions, or other consequences 
should follow.
In addition to the CPC list, the commission maintains a list of secondary 
offenders, whose offenses against religious freedom are not so severe as to 
cause them to be included on the CPC list. Nevertheless, there are serious 
violations of religious freedom, which we think should be taken into account 
by our policymakers, and we believe that our diplomacy should include efforts 
to press these countries to improve their human rights records. Russia, for 
example, is on that list. We monitor other nations as well. We have recently 
been paying attention to some Western European countries where we see a 
revival of anti-Semitism, and we are worried that governments are not doing 
enough to combat this ancient, horrible curse. Also, there is strong anti-Mus-
lim sentiment in some areas. Some Muslims are denied their rights. Also, of-
ten Christians are denied their rights by regimes that are committed to a very 
ideological form of secularism. We believe, for example, that Muslim girls 
should be able to wear their hijab in schools, that Christian girls should be 
able to wear little crosses and Jewish girls to wear Stars of David around their 
necks, as religiously inspired jewelry. In places where that is not permitted, we 
see an offense against religious freedom.
Something like that is not so bad as to warrant the inclusion of a country 
on a CPC list, but it is still bad and we want to push back against that and 
encourage countries to be more welcoming of public religious expression by 
their people. We do not fear religious diversity. We do not think that religious 
diversity leads to social breakdown or animosity. It can happen, but so can 
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ethnic differences of all sorts, tribal differences, even differences having to do 
with secular ideologies. So we believe that respect for religious diversity can, 
where it is handled properly, be a positive social force, and this takes me to the 
last part of your question.
What is the importance of interfaith dialogue? It is tremendously impor-
tant. As you know, Alex, I have devoted much of my adult life to promoting 
ecumenical and interreligious dialogue. I have been very active in promoting 
dialogue between Catholics and Evangelicals, between Catholics and Mor-
mons, and between Christians and Jews. I have tried to play a role in encour-
aging dialogue between Evangelical Protestants and Mormons, even though 
I don’t myself belong to either of those categories. But, I have such strong 
friendships; both in the Evangelical community and the Mormon community 
that I find that I am able to broker discussions between them. I have been 
deeply involved in Jewish-Christian dialogue and Christian-Muslim dialogue. 
One of my role models here has been the great English public intellectual, and 
my dear friend, Rabbi Jonathan Sacks, the former chief rabbi in Great Britain. 
And let me tell you something, like Rabbi Sacks, I want more than simply 
dialogue. I want cooperation and collaboration. In the pro-life movement, for 
example, I am beginning to see something that I had long hoped and prayed 
for, which is cooperation not only between Catholics and Evangelicals, which 
we have had for a long time, but cooperation between Catholics, Evangeli-
cals, Mormons, Orthodox Jews and Muslims. Some of the most magnificent 
pro-life testimonies that I’ve heard in recent years have been from Muslims, 
people like the writer Suzy Ismail and the great Islamic scholar and teacher 
Shaykh Hamza yusuf. These are American Muslims who speak eloquently in 
defense of the right to life of the child in the womb. I want to see that type 
of cooperation and collaboration not simply on pro-life matters, but on other 
issues as well: on marriage and the family, on religious freedom. It is very 
important that we have more Muslim voices heard on religious freedom. A 
lot of non-Muslims in the West believe that no Muslims believe in religious 
freedom. This is false. Obviously there are many people in the various Muslim 
cultures that do not have a robust concept of religious freedom, but there are 
also many who do and some of them are speaking out and yet their voices are 
not heard by non-Muslims. I want to amplify those voices.
I think interfaith understanding and cooperation is one of those condi-
tions for the flourishing of democracy I was referring to earlier. I believe that 
the future is going to be a religious future. It is not going to be a secularist 
future.
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I think we are living in a post-secular age. This is not obvious to people 
in Western Europe or the United States, because secularism is so far advanced 
in these cultures. I think that that is going to turnout to be a short-lived phe-
nomenon. I think that we are going to be living in a religious future, whether 
secularists like it or not. We will all be well-served if it is a religious future in 
which people of different faiths know each other, appreciate each other, un-
derstand each other, cooperate with each other, and when they have differenc-
es, discuss those differences in a civil and respectful manner. So, I am working 
as hard as I can to try to bring about those conditions.
MAV: Which is much more than tolerance...
RPG: yes, much more than tolerance. George Washington, the first 
American President, we call him the Father of our Country, when he was 
elected President, was sent a note of congratulations from the very small Jew-
ish community in the United States, living mostly in Newport, Rhode Island. 
That is where the first synagogue in America was founded. The members 
of that congregation sent Washington a letter saying how happy they were 
that he had become President of the United States, and that they hoped that 
he would have tolerance for the Jewish people. He wrote back a magnificent 
letter. I hope the readers of this interview will go to the internet and find it: 
«The Letter of George Washington to the Hebrew Congregation of New-
port, Rhode Island.» Washington accepts, very graciously, their praise and 
their words of gratitude and goes on to note that one thing they say is not 
quite correct. Here is what he said:
«It is now no more that toleration is spoken of as if it were the indulgence 
of one class of people that another enjoyed the exercise of their inherent nat-
ural rights, for, happily, the Government of the United States, which gives to 
bigotry no sanction, to persecution no assistance, requires only that they who 
live under its protection should demean themselves as good citizens in giving 
it on all occasions their effectual support.»
I think that Washington, even in the late 18th century when he is writing, 
had already seen what I am proposing for the future. What we need is not sim-
ply tolerance; it is equal citizenship and full collaboration. you know, religious 
people have much more in common than what divides them. Religious people 
understand each other, or if they don’t, they should. They understand each oth-
er because they realize that the world is not reducible to material and efficient 
causes. There is more to human life than that. There is an open horizon. We 
are not constrained within the domain of material and efficient causality. We 
are self-transcending creatures – spiritual as well as material beings. We have 
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freedom of the will. We are capable of causing things that we are not caused to 
cause, a literally God-like quality. In fact, I believe that that is what the Bible in 
Genesis 1 is teaching us when it says than man is made in the very image and 
likeness of God. The Bible there is confirming something that we all know from 
our personal experience, and that is that unlike the brute animals, we are ration-
al and free agents. But if that is true, then the human being is not reducible to 
the material; and if that is true, there is a spiritual domain; and if that is true, 
well, you can see how the argument goes. We need to be open to a much richer 
set of possibilities, including the possibility of God’s communicating to us in 
various ways than we would be if we were nothing more than material.
MAV: Among other things that I have read on the Internet, you have 
been labeled «conservative», «Christian», a «natural law supporter», includ-
ing pro-life and pro-marriage, and also Communitarian, that I have read in 
Spanish. Are you comfortable with these descriptions? Would you like to 
make any comment on them?
RPG: Labels can be useful. I do not object to labels, but they must be 
understood carefully and critically, because the same word means different 
things in different contexts and in different cultures. Friedrich von Hayek, the 
great economic thinker, declined to call himself a conservative, even though 
most people in the U.S. thought of him as a conservative. They thought of 
him that way because as the term «conservative» is used in America, he was a 
conservative. But he did not want to be called a conservative because Hayek 
was not an American. He became an American, but he came from Europe and 
the word «conservative» to his European ears meant something different. It 
meant what we might call «throne-and-altar» conservatism. It meant a world 
of hierarchy, a world of established religions, of limited freedoms, of strong 
authority. But, of course, to the American, that is not what conservatism is.
American conservatives are not «throne-and-altar» conservatives, much 
less are they «blood and soil» conservatives. They are Madisonian conserva-
tives, which from a European conservative point of view would mean a «lib-
eral.» So, in the end, Hayek declined even to call himself a libertarian. He 
decided that the best label for himself would be either a classical liberal or an 
Old Whig. So, we have to be careful of these things. In a certain sense, one 
that makes sense in America, I am a conservative. There may be a certain sense 
in which I am a communitarian, but not in the sense that Americans usually 
use that term. I am certainly not a socialist. I am not a proto-socialist. I believe 
in the market economy, though I am not a libertarian. I don’t believe in the 
laissez-faire system. I believe that there are justified limitations of the market, 
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regulations are necessary. But I believe that a sound economy that serves the 
common good will be fundamentally a market economy. So I am not a liber-
tarian, and I am not a socialist.
Am I a communitarian? This depends on what you mean by that term. 
In the way that the term in used in the United States, I am not. But in the way 
that the term is used elsewhere, perhaps I am. I am certainly a «communi-
tarian,» if by that one means a person who rejects the ideology of expressive 
individualism or «me-generation liberalism.» I’m against that ideology, just 
as I am against communism and fascism. Now that is important because it is 
the dominant ideology in elite sectors of American culture, including in most 
universities, and it goes by the label «liberalism» (or «progressivism»). To 
say that one is a liberal, no longer means what it meant under Franklin De-
lano Roosevelt or John F. Kennedy. Today it means that one is for abortion, 
marriage to be redefined so that we have same-sex partnerships, those kinds 
of things. These are the dogmas of expressive individualism under the label 
«liberal», because the meaning of the term has changed. So yes, I am against 
expressive individualism or radical individualism of any kind. If that is what 
people mean when they say: «Robert George is a communitarian», then I say 
«yes, Robert George is a communitarian». But, again, we have to read the 
term carefully and critically because it can mean different things to American 
ears than to Latin American or European ears.
MAV: It seems this would be because you pay attention to civil society, 
not only to the individual.
RPG: yes, that’s right. The holes you see in my shirt. Those are the 
(thankfully, metaphorical) bullet holes that have come from being shot at by 
the libertarians and the expressive individualists, because I am a critic of all 
forms of individualism. I am an advocate of civil society and I believe in mar-
riage and in the sanctity of human life, and of course these beliefs are regarded 
as anathema to expressive individualists and me-generation liberals.
MAV: What do you think when freedom of thought and freedom of 
speech are attacked, especially in the university, which is supposed to be the 
place of freedom of thought and the development of thought.
RPG: The greatest threat to intellectual life in the United States today, 
and I believe this is true in Canada and in some European countries, is the 
phenomenon of groupthink. People are not thinking for themselves. They are 
simply conforming their views to dominant positions, to orthodoxies. Where 
that happens, intellectual life is strangled. Intellectual life can only flourish 
where people think for themselves, think deeply, think critically, and where 
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people do that they will often reach different conclusions, and then people 
who have formed different conclusions engage each other in a civil and re-
spectful manner. They engage each other not in a contest to see who is a 
winner and a loser, but in the common project of trying to get to the truth of 
matters. Groupthink is toxic to intellectual life and to any institution, like a 
university, that is dedicated to advancing knowledge and pursuing truth. And 
the trouble today is that intimidation is used to compel people to conform 
their opinions to the dominant position, to the orthodoxies, or else to simply 
keep their mouths shut and say nothing on controversial questions.
Today, good values of equality, inclusion, mutual respect, are used as pre-
texts for shutting down debate, for imposing one view on an entire community, 
despite the fact that there are reasonable people of goodwill who have another 
view. People are smeared and accused of being bigots, or homophobes or mi-
sogynists, simply because they dissent from the prevailing orthodoxy on the 
university campus. This is not only unjust, it is not only a violation of the aca-
demic freedom of the members of university communities, it is also poisonous 
to the mission of the university, where there is not the effective freedom (going 
beyond mere formal freedom) to dissent, at least in institutions that represent 
themselves as welcoming all points of view. It would be somewhat (though not 
entirely) different for an institution that devotes itself to one particular religion 
or one particular philosophy. But at least in the case of universities, like my own 
university, Princeton, that present themselves as open to all points of view, it is 
toxic for some views to be excluded because some people feel that they will be 
stigmatized and marginalized for expressing those views.
There is a place for catechism class, but I don’t think the university is the 
place for catechism, and when the university is used for catechism class, whether 
the faith in question is radical individualism or Marxism, or Liberalism or what-
ever that is, where that happens you don’t have a university anymore. you have 
the formal structure of a university, you have the buildings, you have a group 
of people who are called faculty members and you have those who are called 
students; but what is missing is what makes the university a university, and that 
is fidelity to the mission of seeking truth, knowledge, understanding, wisdom.
